Court Throws Out Federal Law Allowing Government to Commit Sex Offenders Upon Release From Prison
In 2006, the U.S. Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act to combat sexual violence, exploitation, and abuse of children. The Adam Walsh Act was designed to narrow the gap between federal and state efforts to combat crimes against children. One provision of the Act allows the federal government to commit "sexually dangerous persons" to institutions for the mentally ill upon their release from prison. A federal judge has struck down this commitment provision. See United States of America v. Comstock, Case No. 5:06-HC-2195-BR (Eastern Dist. of North Carolina, Western Div, Sept 7, 2007).
Judge W. Earl Britt threw out the commitment provision on the grounds of federalism and Constitutional protections. Under the Adam Walsh Act, the Federal Bureau of Prisons may petition a federal court to stop the release of a prisoner and commit him to the custody of the Attorney General if the court finds "by clear and convincing evidence" that he is a sexually dangerous person. The prisoner may be committed until a state will assume responsibility or until he is no longer "sexually dangerous to others."
The United States Supreme Court has already upheld such commitment laws enacted by the states. The plaintiffs, in Comstock, argued that the Congress, however, did not have the power to enact the federal commitment provision and that the "clear and convincing" standard of proof violates the prisoners' Constitutional protections.
The Government argued that commitment proceedings are a civil matter requiring only a clear and convincing standard, rather than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for criminal matters. In the primary state case, the Supreme Court ruled that committing a mentally ill person is not a criminal matter and that psychological evaluation is so difficult that finding someone to be sexually dangerous beyond a reasonable doubt is too high a standard. The Adam Walsh Act, on the other hand, requires not only a finding that someone is sexually dangerous, but that he has committed sexual crimes in the past. Judge Britt ruled that the person's past sexual crimes must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before he can be committed.
To overcome the plaintiffs' argument that the Congress had no power to enact the commitment provision, the Government countered that the Constitution allows the Congress to pass laws that are "necessary and proper" for carrying out the federal government's duties. The Government pointed to several duties --- prosecution of federal crime, prevention of criminal conduct, and the regulation interstate commerce --- for which the Act was necessary and proper. The Judge found that the Government could not show how the commitment provision was necessary to the prevention of any specific federal crime or invoked the Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Because the commitment provision was not properly related to any federal law, Judge Britt ruled that only the states could commit a sexually dangerous person following his serving of his prison sentence.